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Judicial emotions—their display in the courtroom, influ-ence on judicial behavior, and ultimately, their impact onpublic trust in the judiciary—are under scrutiny as neu-
roscientists and social scientists take a fresh look at judicial
work and conduct. Emotions and their regulation raise impor-
tant issues for the exercise of judicial authority, a role in which
emotion is formally excised.1 What has been called “emotional
labor” is one of several key concepts guiding empirical
research and offering insights into how judges undertake their
work.2 Other related or overlapping concepts include implicit
bias, mindfulness, and procedural fairness. Judges have been
introduced to these concepts and associated research through
several articles published in the journal Court Review over
recent years.3 One of these articles, an American Judges Asso-
ciation white paper titled “Minding the Court: Enhancing the
Decision-Making Process,” highlights the degree to which
these scientific insights are interrelated in their implications
for judicial work.4 For example, consideration of these con-
cepts and research initiatives has implications for judicial per-
formance and the conduct of evaluations.5
This article seeks to enhance understanding of the role of
emotions in judging and how emotions interrelate with other
factors that influence judicial conduct, especially in court. It
does so by introducing a four-year program of research,
“Changing Judicial Performance: Emotions and Legitimacy”
(hereinafter “Emotions and Judging”), that is empirical in focus
and comparative in perspective. The empirical component
involves multiple sources of data in the United States and Aus-
tralia that bear on the role of emotion in judicial behavior. The
comparative component takes advantage of extensive qualita-
tive and quantitative research available on the Australian judi-
ciary that speaks directly to the use of emotions in judging.6
Comparative research helps to refine the approach to a topic of
inquiry by raising new conceptual and research questions and,
on that basis, sharpening understanding of that topic. 
This article is organized into five sections, beginning with
an explanation of why judges should be interested in research
on the role of emotions in their work. Section II offers a brief
summary of the social science study of emotions generally and
the manner in which it is being applied to judges. Section III
provides an overview of a new four-year international study of
judging and emotions. Section IV introduces the data sources
available for a comparative study and uses that information to
take an initial look at promising themes for the research. The
concluding section offers preliminary observations on ways
emotions in judging might be studied and the value of such
research. 
Before proceeding, however, it is helpful to be clear on what
is meant by “emotion,” a term capable of covering a wide vari-
ety of states of mind and physical embodiment.7 At a general
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level, “emotions can be viewed as culturally delineated types of
feelings or affects.”8 Emotions can be understood as a product
of social interactions; they are embedded in interpersonal rela-
tions and particular contexts.9 They are experienced,
expressed, or displayed and are recognized or interpreted by
others. Judicial words and actions in court can entail emo-
tional display and project feelings.10
One list of what constitutes “emotion” includes both posi-
tive and negative states of “happiness, joy, pride, guilt, disap-
pointment, anger, frustration and anxiety.”11 Another list,
derived from empirical research (survey data) identifies “nine
primary kinds of experienced emotions—tranquility, hope, joy,
pride, self-reproach, anger, rage, fear, distress—and varying
levels of correlation among these emotions.”12
Empathy has been widely discussed in the context of judg-
ing and has potential implications for understandings of
impartiality,13 though there is considerable debate about
whether empathy or compassion are emotions or capacities.14
Following Susan Bandes and Jeremy Blumenthal’s caution
against using terms for specific emotions “as if they have sta-
ble meanings,”15 this article does not attempt to distinguish
among the various types of emotion judges may experience,
display, or deploy.
I. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EMOTIONS FOR
JUDGING
Conventional understandings cast the judicial role as
strictly unemotional, with impersonality and dispassion cen-
tral to neutrality, legal authority, and legitimacy. Emotion is
viewed as inherently irrational, disorderly, impulsive, and per-
sonal and therefore inconsistent with the legitimate exercise of
judicial authority.16 Performance of judicial authority should
evince emotionlessness.17 These understandings also exclude
and ignore the interpersonal dynamics that occur in court-
rooms. In sociological terms,
the courtroom is more than a
legal setting; it is a social situ-
ation in which information
and emotions must be man-
aged with similar strategies as
in ordinary, everyday face-to-
face interactions.18
The neglect of the emo-
tional and interactive compo-
nents of being a judge may
have several potential conse-
quences for how judges view and perform their work. 
First, despite the ideal of a dispassionate judicial officer, the
everyday work of judging necessarily implicates emotions. They
are engrained in human behavior: “Put succinctly, emotions
and decision making go hand in hand.”19 Being a judge and
having the benefit of a legal education may restrain the influ-
ence of emotions on courtroom behavior and work perfor-
mance, but only to a degree. A recent research study con-
cludes, “Most judges try to faithfully apply the law, even when
it leads them to conclusions they dislike, but when the law is
unclear, the facts are disputed, or judges possess wide discre-
tion their decisions can be influenced by their feelings about
litigants.”20 At the very least, judges must undertake emotion
work to regulate their emotions to present the image or out-
ward appearance in the courtroom they believe appropriate
when presiding over cases.21 Their everyday work also requires
emotional labor to limit the influence of their feelings on their
decisions in individual cases in much the same way that
implicit bias must be countered if its influence in judicial deci-
sions is to be reduced. 
Second, judges’ failure to regulate their own emotions may lead
to a violation of the applicable codes or rules of judicial conduct.
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Codes of judicial conduct and
criteria for judicial performance
evaluation take emotions and
their display into consideration.
Such codes and criteria are most
formally and specifically articu-
lated in the United States. The
American Bar Association’s
Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(adopted in many states) pro-
vides rules and commentary indi-
cating that failure or inability to control emotions puts judges
at risk of disciplinary complaints from litigants, attorneys, and
others. Indeed, “[c]harges of impatient, angry and impolite
behavior on the bench generate a large proportion of com-
plaints filed with judicial conduct commissions.”22 The ABA’s
Model Program for Evaluating Judicial Performance also con-
tains criteria related to the display of emotions.23 In Australia,
guidelines state that it is “desirable to display such personal
attributes as punctuality, courtesy, patience, tolerance and
good humour. . . . A judge must be firm but fair in the main-
tenance of decorum, and above all even-handed in the conduct
of the trial.”24
Third, a conscious and appropriate display of emotions can
play a positive role in court craft. The increased focus on the
positive side of emotion in decision making is general:
“[p]sychologists in recent years have devoted considerable
attention to the role—both positive and negative—that emo-
tion plays in people’s thinking.”25 The positive role emotions
can play in judging is increasingly recognized as judicial offi-
cers are being asked to engage with court users in a more
human and emotionally intelligent way and to manage emo-
tions, both theirs and others’, especially in the courtroom.26
The explicit recognition of a place for emotions in judicial
work is especially evident in concepts such as procedural jus-
tice and therapeutic jurisprudence.27
II. HOW EMOTIONS SHAPE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR ON
THE BENCH
The empirical social science study of emotions and work
developed in the 1980s with a focus on people in jobs requir-
ing interaction with the public. “Emotional labor” referred ini-
tially to the dissonance experienced by people in customer-ser-
vice jobs. Such workers are expected to manage their emotions
in a manner that presents the public with an employer-pre-
scribed presentation of their selves.28 Their outward display is
supposed to be unaffected by their privately felt emotions. In
the pioneering work of Arlie Hochschild, emotional labor is
defined as “the management of feeling to create a publicly
observable facial and bodily display.”29 Over time, the study of
emotional labor extended to professionals like lawyers, med-
ical doctors, and, recently, to judges—sometimes referred to as
“privileged emotion managers.”30 Compared to service work-
ers, “professionals interact with clients rather than customers
and have a much greater degree of autonomy.”31 For these
workers, the nature and complexity of the role of emotions is
different. 
Although there is considerable research and literature on
judges, the nature of judging, judicial decision making,32 and
emotions, both experienced and expressed,33 the role of emo-
tion in judging, especially in the courtroom, is an emerging
field of research.34 Scholarly attention to emotions in criminal
justice, especially trials and sentencing, tends not to consider
emotion in relation to the judicial role across the range of judi-
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cial assignments and judicial actions.35 Some legal scholars
provide important conceptual insights about judicial emotion
but often depend on the reflections of a few judicial officers
rather than substantial empirical data.36 Similarly, the consid-
erable professional literature about judicial performance eval-
uation, especially in the United States, mainly describes prac-
tical aspects of evaluation and rarely incorporates explicit
attention to displays of emotion or to judges’ experiences and
perceptions.37 One exception, an observational study of court-
rooms in two American municipal courts supplemented by
interviews with 12 of their judges, concludes, “it is clear that
the professional work of judges is actually quite emotional,
especially during the legal process.”38
This brief summary of existing perspectives and research sets
the stage for introducing the Emotions and Judging Project, ded-
icated to building a more systematic empirical foundation for
studying how judges experience, manage, and display emotions,
especially in the interactive environment of the courtoom. 
III. THE EMOTIONS AND JUDGING PROJECT39
The Emotions and Judging Project is a program of research
designed to generate original empirically based knowledge
about emotion and judging by investigating how emotion
(including emotionlessness) is performed and managed. It
aims to explain under which conditions judicial emotion and
emotional expression appear and assess when and how such
emotions enhance or detract from judicial performance. It will
integrate new knowledge about judicial emotion with core
concepts of impartiality and legitimacy to build an innovative
understanding of judicial behavior, especially in relation to, or
when interacting with, others in court. 
In social science terms, this comparative project addresses
the “fit” between emotion in judges’ everyday work and the
norms (explicit and implicit) regarding judicial performance
and its evaluation. Norms are expectations for behavior that
can be enforced either as a rule
by an authority (e.g., judicial
canons) or by less formal repu-
tation-based consequences (the
latter are sometimes called
“social norms”).40
The Emotions and Judging
Project responds to four key
changes in judicial work that
heighten the role of emotions,
positively and negatively. First,
the norms of judicial behavior are
changing in ways that will expect
or even require certain kinds of
potentially emotionally laden conduct, or at least the appearance
of greater engagement, and to recognize the emotional and
social needs of others in the courtroom. One example is the
growth of problem-oriented courts, such as drug courts, mental-
health courts, and community courts. These courts often draw
on therapeutic jurisprudence principles and increasingly rely on
practices based on procedural fairness.41 The link between judg-
ing and both therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural fairness
is not limited to problem-oriented courts; these ideas, along with
procedural-fairness principles and approaches, are beginning to
inform everyday judicial work in Australia and in the United
States, especially in lower courts.42
Second, another growing challenge to the conventional
understanding of judging as detached and emotionless is the
increasing proportion of litigants in the United States and in
Australia that either need to or want to represent themselves in
court. The role of the attorney is either absent or diminished in
such cases. Both developments require greater attention to emo-
tions, different emotional capacities such as empathy, and more
emotion work, including management of the judicial officer’s
own emotions or those of others.43 Each requires some judicial
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engagement with court participants
as people with social relationships
and personal needs rather than as
simply cases or legal categories.44
Third, there is increased atten-
tion to the qualities and skills
needed for judicial performance as
part of initial appointment, ongoing
professional development, and evaluation of individual judicial
performance. Judicial appointment within Australia is being
formalized, with explicit statements of required or expected
skills and qualities.45 Expanded professional development pro-
grams enable judicial officers to improve their performance
according to articulated expectations that sometimes expressly
address emotions.46 Judicial performance evaluation, especially
in the United States, identifies actions that conform to or depart
from models of good or acceptable judicial behavior.47 In the
ABA Model Judicial Performance Survey, relevant criteria are
found in the area of “Professionalism and Temperament” (as
well as under “Integrity and Impartiality”).48 In Australia, judi-
cial performance is coming under broader scrutiny from gov-
ernments and the public.49 This desire for scrutiny and
accountability has a long history in the United States, where
formal judicial performance evaluations take place in nearly
one-half of the states and are encouraged by leading profes-
sional organizations such as the American Bar Association.50
Fourth, the composition of the judiciary is changing, with
more women in all judicial roles. A substantial international
literature addresses the question of whether women judges will
make a difference to judging or will judge differently.51 The
conventional model of the judge may associate legitimate judi-
cial performance with a particular kind of masculinity and its
associated emotions and feeling rules.52 Recent scholarship
suggests that, regardless of whether women themselves judge
differently, it appears that they may be evaluated differently.53
These developments are changing the definition of good
judging. They create a practical tension for judicial officers in
their everyday work and a conceptual tension for those seek-
ing to understand judging. Judicial behavior that effectively
incorporates human personality and feeling may enhance pub-
lic confidence in the courts and the judiciary.54 However, some
human, emotionally laden judicial behavior could indicate that
the judicial officer is not sufficiently detached and so raise
questions about the impartiality and legitimacy of judicial
authority.55 The Emotions and Judging Project addresses these
tensions by examining the ways judicial officers experience
and display emotion and assesses the implications for legiti-
mate judicial performance and its evaluation.
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cial ethics and discipline procedure topics. The winter issue (the
first one in the year) reviews the previous year.” On its blog, the
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Four primary research questions drive the direction and
methods of the Project’s response to these important trends.
They are: 
1. What are the formal rules and informal norms that
govern emotions in the performance of the judicial
role? 
2. What kinds of emotions, emotional expression, and
emotion-related judicial behavior, including emo-
tion-management strategies, actually occur in court
proceedings? 
3. How do judicial officers experience and understand
the role of emotions in their work?
4. How can judging and judicial performance be con-
ceptualized to take account of the place of emotion in
the everyday work of judicial officers? 
Next is a description of the relevant data available in Aus-
tralia and in the United States and a preliminary assessment of
what that data can reveal in relation to the four questions. The
different types, quality, and quantity of data available from
each country will be a critical element in the comparative
aspect of the Emotions and Judging Project.
A. AUSTRALIAN DATA
Since 2000, the Magistrates Research Project and the Judicial
Research Project of Flinders University, led by Sharyn Roach
Anleu and Kathy Mack, have undertaken extensive empirical
research into many aspects of the Australian judiciary on a
national basis.56 The projects have used interviews, surveys,
and observation studies to investigate the attitudes of magis-
trates and judges toward their work, their experiences of their
everyday work, and the ways
matters are handled in court.57
Taken together, these varied
data sources provide extensive
information on judicial emo-
tional experiences and on the
ways emotion appears in the
interactive dimensions of the
courtroom.58 In particular, the
Judicial Research Project’s
National Court Observation
Study has collected data on
several aspects of the interac-
tive dimensions of the court-
room, especially judicial
demeanor.59
B. UNITED STATES DATA
The last large-scale
national study of United
States judges was conducted in the late 1970s.60 More recently,
evaluations of problem-solving courts have involved observa-
tions and surveys of judges and participants. There is no equiv-
alent to the Judicial Research Project’s rich data archive of
social science research on which to build an analysis that can
meaningfully address the research questions. Instead, the start-
ing point for the United States is two sources of publicly avail-
able information that can be used to identify the role emotion
plays in disciplinary actions.61
The archive of the Center for Judicial Ethics is the only
national source of information on such disciplinary actions.62
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The Center’s director, Cynthia
Gray, kindly provided the
authors with descriptions of 78
disciplinary cases in the Center’s
archive of disciplinary actions
during the years 2011 to 2014.
These included examples of
“improper judicial demeanor by
a judge on the bench” as well as
incidents that relate to “abuse of
contempt power,” which can be
seen as expressions of anger.63
The Project team will supple-
ment this national source by
accessing the online detailed public records of the Arizona
Commission on Judicial Conduct. Arizona appears to maintain
the most comprehensive publicly available descriptions of the
specific events underlying the behavior that led to a public
finding of misconduct. These public records allow us to place
disciplinary actions based on judicial emotions into a wider
context of discipline based on other behaviors.64
Disciplinary action against Australian judges and magistrates
is initiated through misconduct proceedings and generally
becomes public knowledge only when it results in an attempt
to remove the judicial officer from office. This usually requires
a resolution of both houses of the parliament.65 New South
Wales and the Australian Capital Territory are the only juris-
dictions with a formal misconduct process that provides public
information on serious disciplinary complaints and their out-
comes.66 However, such proceedings are very rare. In other
states and territories, misconduct complaints are dealt with
informally and do not enter the public record. The specific
nature of misconduct proceedings and the criteria defining mis-
conduct vary by the state or territory in which a complaint is
filed and by the level of court on which a judge serves.67
This article looks at some examples of disciplinary actions
drawn from the United States’ Center for Judicial Ethics’
national archive as a way to identify themes that might answer
some of the Project’s research questions. The examples of disci-
plinary actions based on emotions relate to the situation in the
United States, taking advantage of what can be learned from
emotional displays or reactions that led to a complaint being
filed with a disciplinary body and ultimately made public. Such
archives of public actions provide excellent sources of data for
researchers concerned with judicial work as well as with show-
ing how a state judiciary can demonstrate its accountability to
the public. For the Emotions and Judging Project, the archives
make it possible to conduct comparative research on emotions
in judging in both Australia and the United States. 
IV. WHAT DOES JUDICIAL MISBEHAVIOR BASED ON
EMOTIONS LOOK LIKE? 
This section provides an overview of what can be learned
from the two data sources available to study emotions and
judging in the United States, starting with the national archive
and then looking at the information available from Arizona. 
A. CENTER FOR JUDICIAL CONDUCT ARCHIVES
Under the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, ways in
which judges can behave intemperately leading to disciplinary
action include “rude and abusive behavior, biased comments,
misuse of the contempt power, and treatment of court staff,
including sexual harassment.”68 Here, the focus is on three
excerpts from public disciplinary actions as a first look at judi-
cial misconduct related to emotions and a sense of the kinds of
issues likely to be important to the Emotions and Judging Pro-
ject.69 These examples are chosen to illustrate research themes
rather than to provide a comprehensive or representative
overview of the range of cases that entail emotion display and
judicial misconduct. Each example is followed by comments
on the issues raised about the study of emotions and judging.
1. Anger Acknowledged But Continued 70
The first example comes from West Virginia in 2012 and
relates to divorce proceedings. The judge began with the fol-
lowing interchange with Complainant 1: 
Judge: Before we get started . . . , if you say
one word out of turn you’re going to
jail . . . do you understand me? Yes or
no?
Complainant 1: Yes.
Judge: After we closed here you went out
there talked to a reporter . . . five sec-
onds after you left here. . . . This
morning I now see an article from
your little buddy Smith with a picture
of my home . . . my home on the front
page.
Complainant 1: [inaudible]
Judge: SHUT UP! [sound distortion] Did I
tell you to speak? My wife is disabled,
she is there alone . . . and you, you dis-
gusting piece of . . . you put our pic-
ture of my house . . . because of you 
. . . my house has been vandalized four
times[.] [Y]ou realize that of course
because I’m sure you’re probably in on
it laughing about it. I swear to you.
You’re responsible. You are responsi-
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ble. I am holding you personally
responsible for anything that happens
at my house. . . . It’s disgraceful that
you and your little buddies do not
have the guts, the integrity, just the
human decency, but no you gotta
threaten my family now, well buddy,
[it’s] personal . . . it is personal. You
have threatened my family and I
promise you you will not hear the end
of it from me. In fact. I’m going to
recuse . . . I tell you I’m too angry to
even be appropriate in this case.
Moments afterward, the judge apologized to Complainant
1’s ex-wife and her counsel and decided not to recuse himself
from the case. The judge continued the hearing, later accusing
Complainant 1 of telling “a damn lie and you know it’s a damn
lie.” Several times when Complainant 1 attempted to speak,
the judge cut him off and told him to “shut up.”71
In this interaction, the judge allowed personal feelings to
influence his courtroom conduct, including starting the pro-
ceedings with an explicit threat to incarcerate one of the par-
ties. The judge commenced hearing the matter with a display
of anger and a threat.72 This display of emotion was reactive.
The complainant had talked with a reporter, and, as a result, a
photo of the judge’s house appeared in the newspaper. The
judge linked this behavior with the subsequent vandalization
of his house and fear for the safety of his wife, resulting in the
display of anger in the courtroom. In the transcript, the judge
acknowledges that he is angry and unable to be impartial but
decides to continue hearing the case, despite the earlier claim
that he would recuse himself, and almost immediately resumes
his inappropriate conduct toward one of the parties. 
The Judicial Hearing Board considered this incident among
other complaints about the judge’s behavior. The judge was
found to have violated the West Virginia Code of Judicial Con-
duct. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia accepted
the Board’s recommended sanction: censuring the judge for 24
violations and suspending him without pay until the end of his
judicial term (another four years).
2. Antagonism Toward a Courtroom Participant73
The second excerpt, from New Jersey in 2011, involved the
filing of cross-complaints for restraining orders from Ms. P and
Mr. P. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee
on Judicial Conduct summarizes: 
[A]fter [the judge] granted Ms. P.’s request for an adjourn-
ment to provide her the opportunity to obtain counsel,
Mr. P. brought up the fact that he had not seen the couple’s
four-year[-]old child for approximately one week. . . .
After asking Mr. P. several questions about his living
arrangements, [the judge] asked Ms. P., “Why shouldn’t
[Mr. P.] see his daughter?” . . . [The judge] thereafter insti-
tuted a temporary visitation
schedule for Mr. P., which was
set to expire on January 7,
2010, the day of the parties’
next court date. . . .
When Ms. P. indicated that
her daughter was “not used
to being with her father” for
the length of time scheduled,
[the judge] asked Ms. P. why
she would have a problem
allowing her daughter to
spend time with her father
when she had “no problem
sending [her] daughter to a
preschool where the first day
she went, she was with total
strangers.” . . . The dialogue between [the judge] and Ms.
P. continued as follows:
Ms. P.: You don’t need to yell at me, please.
Judge: Ma’am, don’t talk. You’ve got a problem with
your daughter seeing her father?
Ms. P.: Yes, I do, yes, I do, Your Honor, yes, I do.
Judge: Well, ma’am, let me tell you something.
Ms. P.: I do.
Judge: You need some serious help.
Ms. P.: Okay.
Judge: Because you have no clue what it is to be a
parent.
Ms. P.: Okay. He has a severe mental illness.
Judge: Ma’am, keep your mouth quiet. When I talk,
you listen. Don’t you dare talk back to me. I
don’t know who you think you’re talking to,
but you do not dare talk back to me. You
understand that?
Ms. P.: Yes.
Judge: Then obey it. I’m not some friend of yours
out on the street. I’m a Superior Court judge
that demands the respect of my position, and
you will give it to me. And you will not con-
vince me that it’s okay for your daughter to
go spend time with strangers, but can’t with
her own father, because you know what you
forgot? Let me remind you. There’s only one
reason why he’s her father, that’s the decision
you made.
Ms. P.: And it was a bad one.
Judge: Ma’am—so, what does that tell me about your
judgment? If you made a bad decision choos-
ing him as a father, why should I believe any-
thing about your judgment today? Well, you
just admitted, you’ve got bad judgment.
Ms. P.: I made a mistake. We all make mistakes, I’m
human.













74. Id. at 4-7. 
75. In re Baker, No. ACJC 2010-151 (N.J., May 2, 2011) (Order),
available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/D-95-
10%20Baker%20Reprimand%20ACJC.pdf. 
76. In re Jones, No. JC-10-069-C (N.H. Jud. Conduct Committee, July




Judge: And you’re making
a huge mistake
when you tell me
today that you don’t
think your daughter
deserves to be with
her father.
Subsequently:
Judge: Ma’am, don’t talk
back to me. Who do
you think you are?
Any parent that
takes steps to limit
the other parent’s
time with the child 
doesn’t qualify to be a parent. You want to do
what’s good for your daughter, encourage her to
go spend time with her father. That’s her father.
Not a stranger. He has equal rights, as you. You
don’t get any preference because you’re her
mother. And if you made a mistake, too bad.
We’re not going to punish your daughter today
because of your poor judgment, and I’m not
going to allow your poor judgment to continue.
You understand that?
Ms. P.: Um hum.
Judge: When you come back on the 7th, you’d better
hope that we don’t hear there’s been a problem
with these three short periods of time, because
if it was up to me, I was going to allow him to
have your daughter from now until next
Wednesday.
Ms. P.: She wouldn’t go.
Judge: Oh, yes, she would. Oh, yes, she would. Because
you don’t understand, when I order it, it hap-
pens. It’s not a request of you, it’s an order. You
know what happens if you disobey a court
order? Ma’am, do you know what happens?
Ms. P.: Yes, I understand what happens.
Judge: You’ll be sitting over there with this guy right
here [referring to a shackled prisoner sitting in
the courtroom]. This is not a request. I am
telling you, it will happen.
Ms. P.: Okay, Your Honor.
Judge: And I am telling you—
Ms. P.: Okay.
Judge: —there will be consequences if you interfere
with it. We understand each other?
Ms. P.: Yes.
Judge: All right. . . . Sir, enjoy your time with your
daughter.74
The New Jersey Supreme Court reprimanded the judge for
making extreme and excessive remarks, in a loud, hostile,
angry, and antagonistic manner, to a mother after she ques-
tioned a visitation schedule.75
The judge clearly took sides in the custody dispute largely
based on his own belief about best practices in child rearing
and berated the party with whom he disagreed. The discipli-
nary committee relied heavily on the tone and volume of voice
exhibited by the judge, noting that “the audio recording of the
. . . proceeding was instrumental” in its decision to discipline
the judge. Unlike the case above, the emotion display here
does not seem to have been triggered by the actions of the
applicant. The judge’s decision is cast as a series of threats. If
the daughter and mother do not comply with the court order,
the judge indicates: “You’ll be sitting over there with this guy
[a shackled prisoner].” This threatening language is perhaps
used to invoke the emotion of fear on the part of the mother. 
3. Judicial Overreach76
In the next example, the judge’s statements and interchange
with the prosecutor display anger and frustration. The judge
went so far as to threaten contempt proceedings, thus silenc-
ing the prosecutor. The police chief filed a grievance, and the
State of New Hampshire Judicial Conduct Committee
describes the complaint: 
[I]n the context of a criminal matter . . . wherein the
defendant appeared pro se for a trial on a Class B misde-
meanor, [the judge] informally inquired of the defen-
dant as to whether he had any evidence showing that his
driver[’]s license was not suspended. Following collo-
quy in open court between the Court and the defendant,
[the judge] asked the defendant whether he would like
to hear any more evidence. When the police prosecutor
. . . objected reminding the Court that [the State] had
not proffered any evidence, . . . [the judge] informed the
prosecutor that the State had indirectly put forward its
evidence. When the prosecutor continued to request
that the Court move forward with trial of this matter,
[the judge] responded . . . , “Be quiet. Be quiet. OK? Hey.
When you sit up here you can decide. All right? Be
quiet. Listen, one more time, be quiet. One more time,
and I’m going to have these folks take you out of here,
OK? There is a certain protocol—certain protocol you
have? Certain protocol that I have. And you are stepping
over the line. Don’t step over the line.” When the prose-
cutor further attempted to address the Court, [the
judge] responded: “One more time, one more time, one
more time and you’re out of here. You decide. You
decide.” Under the threat of an apparent contempt find-
ing, the prosecutor said nothing further.77
In this example, the judge’s responses seems disproportion-
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ate to the prosecutor’s reminder that the State “had not prof-
fered any evidence” and request to continue with the trial. The
judge’s comments suggest his anger was caused by the prose-
cutor’s intervention before the defendant could answer, which
he perceived as disrupting court hierarchy, thereby questioning
judicial status. The judge’s anger is framed as reinforcing judi-
cial authority: “When you sit up here you can decide.” The
judge is delineating the professional boundaries between the
judiciary and the prosecution. By closing his demands with the
questions “OK?” and “All right?” and the threat of contempt
proceedings, the judge obtains the prosecutor’s compliance
and further demonstrates to the defendant (and others in the
courtroom) that the judge controls the proceedings and the
participation of other participants. 
The New Hampshire Judicial Conduct Committee found
that the judge had violated several Canons of the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct and ultimately issued a reprimand. It also deter-
mined that “no . . . violations will recur by virtue of [the
judge’s] retirement” and that “the violations [were] not of a
sufficiently serious nature to warrant the imposition of formal
discipline by the court.”78
B. A FOCUS ON ARIZONA
The examples above are derived from the Judicial Conduct
Center’s database that seeks to include all public sanctions
against a judge. The cases in that national database reflect a
variety of state codes of judicial conduct and disciplinary sys-
tems.79 For consistency in such arrangements, a focus on a sin-
gle state seemed the best source for preliminary analysis. Exam-
ination of the judicial conduct commissions and their actions
led to selecting Arizona for a closer look at the role of emotions
in provoking public disciplinary actions. One advantage is that
the Project can draw on all disciplinary actions over a specific
time period and select the ones meeting criteria for discipline
based on emotional displays. The Arizona Commission on Judi-
cial Conduct, via its webpage, provides information on the
numbers of complaints per year and their outcomes: dismissal
of the complaint or sanction of the judicial officer, such as rep-
rimand, censure, suspension, or removal. In cases involving a
sanction, the Commission typically provides a copy of the com-
plaint, a response to the notice of complaint prepared by the
judge or the judge’s lawyer, which is often detailed, and its
order outlining the ways the behavior and demeanor of the
judge contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, while
formal sanctions are rare,80 these cases provide rich and detailed
information on judicial performance and emotion display. 
Both the Center for Judicial Ethics and the Arizona data rep-
resent only the tip of the iceberg of judicial discipline and an
even smaller subset of judicial behavior generally.81 While that
may limit what can be directly or
obviously discerned about the
wider or general role of emo-
tions in judicial behavior, these
materials do assist in addressing
the Emotions and Judging Pro-
ject’s research questions. 
The disciplinary cases can
help clarify the scope and extent
of the formal and informal
norms that govern emotion and
judicial behavior. This is an
example of studying “extreme
cases,” which has both advan-
tages and limitations.82 One
highly influential statement on
the value of extreme cases
argues: 
[A]typical or extreme cases
often reveal more informa-
tion because they activate more actors and more basic
mechanisms in the situation studied. In addition, from
both an understanding-oriented and an action-oriented
perspective, it is often more important to clarify deeper
causes behind a given problem and its consequences
than to describe the symptoms of the problem and how
frequently they occur.83
On that basis, the data sources available to us in the United
States can offer a tentative window into the role of emotions in
judicial behavior at the extreme. 
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, judging has been presented as unemotional,
emphasizing legal rules and reason to the exclusion of feeling
and emotion. That is not currently, if it ever was, a valid
description of how judges make decisions and behave in the
courtroom. Emotion is inherent in all human behavior and is
embedded in social interaction, including in the courtroom.84
The actual desirability of viewing the judicial role as unemo-
tional is being challenged by the changing nature of judicial
work and by the greater understanding of the positive role
emotions can have in generating better case outcomes and
improved public trust at a time in which it is increasingly
required. 
This article offers a first look at the goals and current direc-
tion of the Emotions and Judging Project. One important direc-
tion is to learn from public records of judicial disciplinary
actions in the United States. Over the life of the Project, the
ability to make comparative statements about Australia and the
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United States will grow as more
data are collected. 
Some observations can be made
on the role of emotions in judging
and on ways the study of emotions
relates to current work on proce-
dural fairness and the challenge of
conducting meaningful assess-
ments of judicial performance. 
First, the value of research
focusing on the emotional compo-
nent of judging is evident. The role
of emotion can be seen positively
as intrinsic to adapting to some of the major changes now tak-
ing place in judging. Enhancing the ability of judges to regu-
late their emotions can assist in managing difficult court situ-
ations, such as with self-represented litigants and during the
presentation of victim-impact statements.85 Judicial emotional
display can be a positive factor in achieving desired outcomes
such as reduction in recidivism and increased compliance with
court orders, especially in problem-oriented courts. On the
other hand, it is clear that inappropriate emotional display is
an important factor in some of the most serious disciplinary
actions taken in the United States—and perhaps in less serious
complaints as well.
Second, the potential for insights from studying “extreme
cases” such as public disciplinary actions seems clear. The
work of states like Arizona and the Center for Judicial Con-
duct, in generating and collating public records of state
actions, provides important statements of judicial accountabil-
ity and enables valuable empirical research on the role of emo-
tion in judicial behavior. Anger and other emotions appear to
cause some judges to step out of a proper judicial role and
engage in retribution against or mistreatment of individuals
present in the courtroom. This is not confined to persons who
are directly before the court; those in the public gallery can be
the target of judicial misbehavior. Even recognizing and
acknowledging an inability to regulate emotions in a particular
case does not necessarily prevent a continuation of the
improper behavior on the part of the judge. Emotions can be
the basis of or the means to make evident a judge’s partiality
toward one of the parties to a case. 
Third, in both the United States and in Australia, judges
appear to have few or no clear statements as to what consti-
tutes appropriate demeanor and emotional display. Rules of
conduct tend to be worded in generalities even when com-
mentaries are presented.86 An important goal of issuing public
disciplinary actions is to provide judges with specific guidance
through examples of what constitutes behavior prohibited by
the official rules of conduct.87 Systematic study of these
“extreme cases” can help provide such guidance. However,
these sources are limited in their ability to provide guidance on
positive emotional expression or experience.
Fourth, another potential source of specificity available to
judges in some states are elements of judicial performance
evaluation processes. Questions asked in judicial perfor-
mance evaluation surveys or express criteria used in system-
atic observations of judges in their courtrooms can clarify
expectations. That potential is unrealized for the most part
because of the low quality of most existing surveys and the
untested status of the observational protocols.88 Judicial per-
formance ratings can be affected by the gender89 and race of
the judge and of the observer(s), particularly with respect to
different interpretations of the judge’s demeanor in the court-
room.90 This may especially be the case in relation to emo-
tions, as the expected experience and display of emotion are
deeply gendered and raced.91 As a result, judicial perfor-
mance evaluations might reflect implicit gender and
racial/ethnic bias. Research into emotion and judicial perfor-
mance can potentially improve programs developed to evalu-
ate judicial performance.
Fifth, there are also important positive links between emo-
tion and judicial performance. The emotional state of a deci-
sion maker can influence or mediate the perception of fairness
or its absence in the courtroom on the part of the decision
recipient. Research shows that “people’s emotional state at the
time of making procedural justice judgements can determine
whether or not they perceive an encounter with an authority to
be procedurally fair or not.”92 Therefore, a judge’s appropriate
display and regulation of emotions may underpin the role pro-
cedural fairness plays in satisfaction with general court pro-
ceedings and in the success of new court forums like adult
drug courts in reducing recidivism and increasing compliance
with court orders.93
Understanding links between emotion and procedural fair-
ness offers judicial performance programs criteria that are
[J]udges appear
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potentially better related to judicial performance in terms of
perceived fairness, compliance and cooperation with court
orders, and public satisfaction with and trust in the judiciary.94
Sharyn L. Roach Anleu, B.A. (Honors) Uni-
versity of Tasmania, M.A. University of Tasma-
nia, LL.B. (Honors) University of Adelaide,
Ph.D. University of Connecticut, is Matthew
Flinders Distinguished Professor in the School
of Social and Policy Studies at Flinders Univer-
sity, Adelaide, and a Fellow of the Australian
Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.
With Emerita Professor Kathy Mack, Flinders School of Law, she
is currently engaged in socio-legal research into the Australian
judiciary and courts. She has contributed to the Master’s Program 
at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law,
Oñati, Spain. Contact: judicial.research@flinders.edu.au, website:
http://www.flinders.edu.au/law/judicialresearch/.
David B. Rottman, B.A. (Honors) University
of Illinois at Urbana, M.A. University of Illinois
at Urbana, Ph.D. University of Illinois at
Urbana, is a Principal Researcher at the
National Center for State Courts. His research
considers what underlies public trust in the
courts, the optimal methods for evaluating judi-
cial performance, and principles for governing
court systems. He has published over 60 articles and book chap-
ters on topics important to the state courts, as well as numerous
project reports. With Judges Kevin Burke and Steve Leben and Yale
Law Professor Tom Tyler, he co-founded www.proceduralfair-
ness.org, which promotes application of procedural-fairness prin-
ciples in the work of the state courts.
Kathy Mack, B.A. (magna cum laude) Rice University, J.D. Stan-
ford Law School, LL.M. Adelaide Law School, is Emerita Profes-
sor of Law, Flinders Law School. She is the author of a mono-
graph, book chapters, and articles on alternative dispute resolu-
tion, as well as articles on legal education and evidence. With Pro-
fessor Sharyn Roach Anleu, she has conducted empirical research
involving plea negotiations. Since 2000, they have been engaged in
a major socio-legal study of the Australian judiciary. Contact:
judicial.research@flinders.edu.au, website: http://www.flinders.
edu.au/law/judicialresearch/.
Court Review - Volume 52 71
